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BOOK REVIEWS

Analytic Philosophy of Religion, by James F. Harris. Kluwer, 2002. viii+432
pp. Cloth $150.00.
JOSHUA HOFFMAN and GARY S. ROSENKRANTZ, University of North
Carolina at Greensboro.
This book is volume three of a series published by Kluwer, Handbook of
Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, edited by Eugene Long, which explores
many aspects of contemporary philosophy of religion. Although this book
is primarily a survey of the analytical literature, the author often evaluates
some of this literature.
Chapter I recounts the origins and development of analytic philosophy
and related movements in their various forms, starting at the turn of the
20th century. The author discusses pragmatism, ordinary language philosophy, Moore’s common sense philosophy, and logical positivism, with a
special emphasis on the importance of linguistic or conceptual analysis.
Chapter II addresses the problem of religious language raised by positivism and Popper’s falsificationism and various responses to these challenges. It also deals with the debate over whether religious language is to
be taken literally or as metaphor or analogy, and the problem of religious
reference. The latter focuses on the debate between those who see religious reference as descriptive and those who see it as causal or nondescriptive.
Chapter III ranges over two main topics, the nature of God and arguments for the existence of God. The former topic includes a survey of
recent analytical work on such divine attributes as necessary existence,
omnipotence, omniscience, eternality, impassibility, and so forth. Also surveyed is work on the dilemma of divine foreknowledge and human freedom, including the hard fact/soft fact distinction. The latter includes a
survey of analytical work on the Ontological, Cosmological, Design, and
Cumulative Case Arguments.
In Chapter IV, the author reviews analytic religious epistemology with a
special emphasis on the role of religious experience. He discusses the
James/Clifford debate and James’s Will to Believe Argument, Plantinga’s
Reformed epistemology, fideism, the evidential weight of religious experience, Alston’s views on Christian mystical practice, and various related
arguments.
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Chapter V addresses the conflict between religion and science. Topics
include Galileo’s conflict with the Catholic Church, Darwin’s impact on
philosophical theology and the creationist response to Darwinism, the relativizing of the scientific outlook implicit in the ideas of Kuhn, Feyerabend,
and Whorf, the implications of quantum mechanics for the debate between
science and religion, and Whitehead’s attempt to integrate religion and science through metaphysics.
The main argument against theism in recent analytical work, the problem of evil, is surveyed in Chapter VI. Topics in this chapter include the
logical problem of evil, the evidential problem of evil, and responses to
these such as Plantinga’s free will defense and Hick’s soul-making theodicy.
In Chapter VII, the author surveys various attempts to explain religion
away and various related attempts to provide a naturalistic account of reality. Included among the former attempts are Freud’s psychological
account of religion as wish-fulfillment, Durkheim’s sociological account of
religion in terms of tribalism, and contemporary scientific accounts of the
natural functions of living things and their parts in terms of natural selection and of other apparent instances of design in nature. Included among
the latter are naturalistic theories of personal identity and naturalistic
explanations of near-death and “out of body” experiences.
Chapter VIII surveys analytical work on religion and ethics. Topics
include Mavrodes’s observation that ethics does not fit readily into a naturalistic framework, various versions of the divine command theory of
ethics, the connection between religion and virtue ethics, and the feminist
critique of religious ethics.
Chapter IX explores analytical writing on the problem of religious diversity and religious pluralism. The debate between religious exclusivists and
religious inclusivists, such as John Hick, concerning religious truth and
personal salvation is one of the main foci of this chapter.
Chapter X provides a useful summary of the material covered in the
previous nine chapters.
How good a job does the author do in surveying the literature on the
topics addressed in each of the foregoing chapters? Generally speaking,
the author does a very good job. Chapters I, II, IV-VI, and VIII-IX stand
out in this respect. Chapters III and VII are less satisfactory, mainly
because the author has either neglected some important literature relevant
to his survey, or is unclear himself about some of the crucial concepts
involved in this literature. For example, in Chapter III, the author neglects
to discuss some of the recent important work analyzing the concept of
omnipotence in detail (including that of Hoffman and Rosenkrantz, Flint
and Freddoso, and Edward Wierenga) with the result that his treatment of
omnipotence and the related paradox of the stone is too sketchy and a bit
out of date. Chapter VII is rather a hodge-podge of topics with no clear
organizing principle. Moreover, although the author is correct to distinguish between bundle theories and substance theories of personal identity,
he seems confused about what a substance theory of personal identity is.
On page 313, Harris states that the following quotation from John Hick,
provides a “good description of the substance theory of self”: “We are
using ‘self’ as the name for…the consciousness which is composing these
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sentences.…” But Hick has not described a substance theory at all. If he
had done so, he would have instead said that “We are using ‘self’ as the
name for the thing which is conscious of composing these sentences.…”
Furthermore, the author neglects to discuss genuine substance theories of
the self, such as those of R. M. Chisholm, M. Loux, and E.J. Lowe. (The
authors of this review also defend in detail the intelligibility both of the
concept of a spiritual substance and of dualistic interactionism in Substance
Among Other Categories, Cambridge University Press, 1994, with a further
application to perfect being theology in The Divine Attributes, Blackwell,
2002.) Instead, Harris spends nearly all of his time discussing various versions of the bundle theory of the self, which he correctly says is not compatible with traditional theism. In what follows, we set forth some additional detailed criticisms of the book.
On pages 71-72, Harris misleads the reader by making it appear that a
descriptivist theory of reference requires the referent essentially to satisfy
the conditions in certain relevant definite descriptions. According to
Harris, “To capture the intuition that underlies the causal theory of reference, we can easily imagine a possible world very close to this one in
which the same individual whom we call “Moses” existed but in which
that individual was never put in the bulrushes…and we can do this mental
experiment with the same results for every single known attribute or property commonly attributed to Moses.” But since a descriptivist theory of reference is also compatible with this intuition, it is hard to see how this intuition could be the one that “underlies the causal theory of reference.”
According to Harris, “Human agents cannot intend things that are not
in their control.” (p. 101). But, clearly, human agents can intend things that
are not in their control when they don’t know that those things are not in
their control.
Harris discusses the justified true belief theory of knowledge on pages
141-142. This discussion is peculiar. Harris misleadingly suggests that it is
commonplace to equate epistemic justification with adequate evidence.
However, this is not commonplace because it is widely thought that such
an understanding of epistemic justification would lead to a vicious infinite
regress or circle of justification, and thus, would entail that nobody knows
anything.
The section on modal disproofs of the existence of God, pages 117-119,
would be improved if a discussion of an argument of the following sort
were included. “If God exists in some possible world, then he exists in
every possible world. God fails to exist in some possible world. Therefore,
God fails to exist in every possible world.”
According to Harris, on page 198, “we now know that ‘the best scientific
evidence’ that Galileo presented in support of the Copernican theory in his
Dialogue on the Two World Systems in 1632 was either very weak, misinterpreted, or just plain wrong. Scientists now know that the connections
Galileo drew between sunspots and the earth’s tides and the Copernican
theory were not justified.” It isn’t clear what the author is claiming here,
but surely Galileo’s observations of sunspots did provide good evidence
that at least one important implication of the Ptolemaic theory is false,
namely, that the sun is an immutable perfect sphere.
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According to Harris, “the work of Niels Bohr demonstrated that there is
an irreducible duality of electrons according to which electrons are both
particles and waves.” (p. 221). This statement is dubious. Bohr’s work certainly doesn’t show that some electron is a particle and a wave at the same
time, for that would entail a contradiction. Perhaps Harris meant that Bohr
demonstrated that some electron is a particle at one time and a wave at
another time, or that some electrons are particles and other electrons are
waves. But even these statements are questionable, for arguably, particles
(which are substances) and waves (which are events) differ in their essential
properties, and all electrons, as members of the same natural kind, have the
same essence.
Harris’s discussion of “The God of the Gaps” in Chapter VII has gaps of
its own. As Harris observes, Darwinian accounts can provide a naturalistic
explanation of the natural functions of living organisms and their parts,
and hence, a supernatural account of these functions is no longer needed.
Harris fails to note, however, that nobody has yet provided a naturalistic
explanation of the existence of the first living organism. Until such an explanation is actually provided, the gap between the inanimate and animate
realms has not been conclusively closed. Harris also fails to note the more
difficult, and arguably intractable gap, between the mental and non-mental
realms; it remains a mystery how consciousness and the qualities of subjective experience are explainable in naturalistic terms.
Harris is unclear about the important distinction between epistemic and
metaphysical criteria for personal identity (pp. 313-314). Harris says that the
criterion of personal identity “must allow not just an abstract, metaphysical
explanation…it must allow for an individual’s phenomenological identity
of his current self with earlier states of himself.” But, this appears to conflict with Harris’s other statement that “there is a physical requirement that
must be met if we are ever to grant that successful memory has taken place
between a person and an earlier stage of that person.” Harris is unaware
that in the first quotation he seems to be speaking of an epistemic criterion,
whereas in the second quotation he seems to be speaking of a metaphysical
criterion. A further related distinction is that of first-person versus thirdperson epistemic criteria of personal identity.
Harris assumes that there are cases of brain bisection which give rise to
two separate streams of consciousness, and that these cases create difficulties for the theory that the self is a spiritual substance. According to Harris,
in such a case “a person with a bisected brain appears to have two different
souls” (p. 317). But it is at least equally plausible, as well as consistent
with the theory that the self is a spiritual substance, that there are not two
separate streams of consciousness, but rather a single self with a disorganized mind. Thus, the apparent problem that Harris proposes here is a nonstarter.
Finally, a book such as this one, that is supposed to survey a major field
of analytic philosophy, should definitely have a substantial bibliography.
This book lacks one altogether.

